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Abstract 
In the energy trilemma of reliability, sustainability and affordability, politicians treat reliability 
as over-riding. The EU assumes the energy-only Target Electricity Model will deliver reliability 
but the UK argues that a capacity remuneration mechanism is needed. This paper argues that 
capacity auctions tend to over-procure capacity, exacerbating the missing money problem they 
were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of the 
missing market problems also neglected in the debate. It examines the case for, criticisms of, and 
outcome of the first GB capacity auction and problems of trading between different capacity 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Britain was the first country to introduce a capacity auction to deliver capacity adequacy 
after the EU Third Package3 (to deliver the Target Electricity Model, TEM) was 
announced and it coincided with the date by which the TEM was to come into effect. The 
TEM is designed as an energy-only market that leaves the delivery of capacity adequacy 
to profit-motivated investment decisions by liberalized and unbundled generation 
companies. The UK’s Energy Act 2013 that set out the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
rejected relying on an energy-only market and legislated for auctions to deliver capacity 
adequacy.  
This paper examines the design and justification of that capacity auction, its 
relation to the wider issue of reliability, and criticizes the under-studied issue of how the 
amount of capacity to procure was determined. It argues that typical capacity auction 
designs have a bias towards excess procurement, in contrast to fears that the energy-only 
market would lead to under-procurement. While capacity remuneration mechanisms, of 
which auctions are potentially the best, are intended to address the missing money 
problem, by ignoring the missing market problem they perversely exacerbate the missing 
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money problem. Capacity auction design also raises important questions for cross-border 
trading and the role of interconnectors, which this paper addresses. It argues that it is less 
important to harmonize capacity remuneration mechanisms than to ensure that trade 
between countries is governed by clear market signals or clear out-of-market agreements 
between System Operators (when markets reach price caps or otherwise fail), without the 
fear of political or regulatory over-rides in stress situations. This may require reforms to 
the Security of Supply Directive (2005/89/EC). Given confidence in these stress 
allocation mechanisms, countries have an incentive to address market failures and ensure 
efficient trade. 
Capacity adequacy is the ability “to supply the aggregate electrical demand and 
energy requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking into account scheduled 
and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements” (NERC, 2015). The 
reliability of an electricity system also requires security: “The ability to withstand sudden 
disturbances, such as electric short circuits or unanticipated losses of system components 
…” (ENTSO-E, 2015).4 Security is a public good supplied by the System Operator (SO) 
through his acquisition of a range of ancillary and balancing services, while adequacy 
could, in principle, be delivered by competitive energy-only markets, as the TEM 
envisages (Oren, 2000).  
The core of the TEM is an energy-only market with a single auction platform, 
EUPHEMIA (Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Algorithm) which 
simultaneously clears bids and offers and the use of all interconnectors across the EU, 
fragmenting the market into different price zones only after interconnectors are fully 
used. Its working hypothesis, that energy-only markets will deliver capacity adequacy, 
was based on the experience of Nord Pool, which served as the model for the TEM.  
Nord Pool has operated a successful energy-only trading system for many years, 
as have the major power exchanges such as EEX and APX, without any apparent 
problems of capacity adequacy, but not all EU countries have (or once) followed this 
model. Many markets have made or continue to make capacity payments, and DG COMP 
has been very critical of this practice, arguing that they often have more to do with 
compensating generators for stranded assets than delivering reliability at least cost. The 
GB capacity market is,5 as of mid-2015, the only capacity market to be explicitly 
designed and operating since the announcement of the Third Energy Package.  
As a number of countries are now considering whether, and if so how, to 
introduce a (or reform their) Capacity Revenue Mechanisms it is timely to examine the 
British experience. Eurelectric is the latest organization to recognize that not all EU 
countries will be happy with the reference energy-only markets of the TEM, and 
“recognizes that properly designed capacity markets, developed in line with the objective 
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of the IEM, are an integral part of a future market design.” (Eurelectric, 2015, p4.)  While 
that document discusses what might be required to deliver a reliability standard, it is 
somewhat sceptical on how this might be achieved, instead arguing that “whatever 
reliability standard is chosen, Regulators and TSOs should compute it with 
methodologies and tools that are publicly available.” A second objective of this paper is 
to assess how this might best be done, guided by the principle of addressing the missing 
market problem. 
 
2. Missing money and missing markets 
While ensuring short-term security of supply is normally the duty of the SO, capacity 
adequacy is often the subject of regulatory and political concern. EU electricity markets 
are now liberalized and generation is, for the most part, not regulated but subject, like 
other industries, to normal competition policy. If markets were not subject to policy 
interventions or price caps, it is plausible that capacity adequacy could be delivered by 
profit-motivated generation investment without explicit policy guidance. For this to be 
the case, investors need confidence that the revenue they earn from the energy markets 
(including those supplying the ancillary services that the SO needs to ensure short-term 
stability) will be adequate to cover investment and operating costs.  
If this revenue is not adequate, there is a “missing money” problem (Joskow, 
2013), but if it is potentially adequate but not perceived to be so by generation companies 
or their financiers, then there is a “missing market” problem (Newbery, 1989). Missing 
money problems arise if price caps are set too low (below the Value of Lost Load, 
VoLL), or ancillary services, such as flexibility, ramp-rates, frequency response, black 
start capability, etc. and/or balancing services are inadequately remunerated, and/or 
energy prices are inefficiently low. Inefficiently low wholesale prices seem less likely as 
the normal problem is one of market power raising prices above their competitive level, 
and prices are not necessarily inefficiently low just because there is excess capacity.  
Missing markets create problems if risks cannot be efficiently allocated with 
minimal transaction costs through futures and contract markets, or if important 
externalities such as CO2 and other pollutants are not properly priced. The concept of 
missing markets can be usefully extended to cases in which politicians and/or regulators 
are not willing to offer hedges against future market interventions that could adversely 
affect generator profits. The various arguments for capacity markets have been 
extensively covered in the literature, recently in the Symposium on ‘Capacity Markets’, 
(Joskow, 2013; Cramton et al., 2013). Almost all the discussion about capacity 
mechanisms concentrates on the missing money problem and whether the various market 
and regulatory/political failures are sufficient to justify a capacity mechanism, and if so, 
what form it should best take.6   
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Both the missing money and missing market failures have risen in salience as 
renewable electricity targets have become more ambitious at the same time as the EU 
Emissions Trading System has failed to deliver an adequate, durable and credible carbon 
price, and as such is under constant threat of reform. Absent a futures market with a 
credible counter-party it is hard to be confident that future electricity prices will be 
remunerative for unsubsidized generation, and harder to convince bankers or 
shareholders of the credibility of investment plans based on forecast revenues. If 
renewables continue their planned increase in market share mandated by the EU 
Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC) they will depress average energy prices. This does not 
of itself give rise to an adequacy problem, although utilities may justifiably complain that 
their past investment decisions have been partially expropriated by unanticipated political 
actions. However, it increases the demand for existing balancing services such as primary 
reserves, fast frequency response and inertia and may also increase the need for 
additional ancillary services. If these services are not yet adequately defined and/or their 
future prices are hard to predict there is a missing market problem. If these services are 
underpriced by SOs whose powers of balancing supply and demand may be met by 
administrative or regulatory means (e.g. by requiring those connecting to the grid to make 
some of these services available as part of the grid code), there is a missing money 
problem. In either case these may precipitate a capacity adequacy problem. 
 
2.1 Market failures in delivering reliability 
Before the electricity industry was liberalized and unbundled, the SO had ownership 
control of generation and transmission and was responsible for both system security and 
adequacy. Planned investment ensured that both capabilities would be assessed, which 
was also much easier when essentially all plant had (at least in aggregate) a predictable 
and controllable output. The main security problem to address was very short-run 
increases in demand (notably during intermissions in major sporting events when 
consumers all simultaneously switch on their electric kettles) or those caused by the loss 
of a large station or transmission link. This was addressed by specifying a reserve margin 
and ensuring adequate short-run flexibility by the choice of plant type. Thus the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, CEGB, that pre-dated the British restructuring of 1989, 
computed the required gross reserve margin at 19% based on a Loss of Load Probability 
(LoLP) calculation and a reliability measure (disconnecting some consumers in three 
winters over a 100 years, decided in 1962 (Bates and Fraser, 1974, p122)). It built 
pumped storage systems to provide fast response peaking capacity and to use surplus 
night-time nuclear power (Williams, 1991), as well as jet-derivative gas turbines for fast 
ramping. 
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With liberalization and unbundling all these security services had to be separately 
procured by the SO. Some, such as inertia and the additional security offered by 
interconnectors, came at no cost to the SO. Others had to be procured through balancing 
and contract markets, just when the challenges of handling increasing volumes of 
intermittent and less predictable wind were increasing (Newbery, 2010, introducing 
“Large-scale wind power in electricity markets” in that issue of Energy Policy; Newbery, 
2012b). As problems of intermittency increase, so does the challenge of ensuring that 
these services are efficiently priced and procured (Pöyry, 2014).  
The Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland is probably at the 
forefront of addressing these problems, as it is a small moderately isolated system in 
which individual power stations are large and lumpy relative to peak demand (up to 10%) 
and the system is being adapted to handle up to 70% non-synchronous wind penetration.7 
One (implausible) solution would have price signals varying over very short periods of 
time. A sudden fall in frequency caused by a sudden fall in supply relative to demand 
means that the value of power in the next cycle (1/50th of a second) has increased, and the 
speed of response is key to minimizing the disruption. Fast responders would enjoy the 
sudden increase in price which slower responders would miss. 
Figure 1 lists the various products and their time domain that the SEM Committee 
defined in their consultation document (SEM, 2014), grouped into the three categories of 
Synchronous Inertial Response (SIR, usually delivered by the inertia of synchronized 
generators), operating reserves (primary, POR; secondary, SOR; and tertiary, TOR), and 
Ramping or Replacement Reserves (RR), with some overlap between them.  
If prices were to move in response to instantaneous system conditions, then it 
would be potentially profitable to have the capability to respond on the appropriate time 
scale. In practice, market designs vary in their granularity, with the most flexible having 
5 minute settlement periods (Australia). Some Continental balancing markets have a 15 
minute settlement period,8 while GB and the SEM have a half-hourly settlement period in 
the Day Ahead Market (DAM), and most Continental power exchanges and the 
EUPHEMIA auction platform have hourly resolution in the DAM. Increasing granularity 
improves the accuracy of the temporal pattern of price signals to guide the choice of 
flexibility, but runs up against the practical constraint that the system state requires a 
finite amount of time to re-estimate, probably of the order of minutes, while the 
transaction costs of dealing at high frequency make very short-term markets illiquid. 
Given the inability and absence of energy markets at this level of time granularity, 
new products are needed to supplement existing products. The SEM Committee 
consulted on how to procure them in early 2015, given that the supply side for some 
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substantial inertia, so that if there is a momentary loss of supply, that inertia prevents the 
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services is highly concentrated, raising market power issues. In this case many markets 
are missing as their procurement is still undecided, making it hard to estimate their future 
revenues. When choosing what type of generating plant to build, investors have a choice 
of characteristics with inevitable trade-offs: flexible plant with high ramp rates is either 
more expensive or less efficient than less flexible plant with lower ramp rates, but unless 
investors can forecast the revenue from selling these security services, it is hard to make 
efficient plant choices.  
The classic public good problem facing the regulators and the SO is how to value 
these various services, given that they are provided in bundles of varying proportions by 
different technologies. Some of the services reduce LoLP, and should be informed by the 
VoLL, but others reduce the need to curtail renewable generation, which is a political 
objective of uncertain value. 
 
2.2 Defining and measuring reliability 
Eurelectric (2015) provides a useful summary of the various ways used to measure 
reliability. Most EU electricity systems specify the “Loss of Load Expectation” (LoLE), 
which for most and for GB is three hours per year. Averaging over a large number of 
possible events (cold weather, plant failures, high demand, etc.) for some future period, 
the electricity system should perform better than averaging “Losses of Load events” of 
three hours per year. Clearly there is a difference between losing load for the entire 
population and controlled disconnections for a modest number of consumers, and 
Eurelectric (2015) argues that a better measure is the Loss of Expected Energy (LoEE) or 
Expected Energy Unserved (EEU) measured in MWh/year. National Grid (2014a) uses 
the cost of EEU to determine the procurement amount for the capacity auction.  
The former CEGB had a standard of disconnections in three winters in 100 years 
or 3%, while Belgium had a 1% standard and Spain a 5% standard (Webb, 1977). This 
was often translated into a gross reserve margin (Transmission Entry Capacity less peak 
load) required to deliver the reliability standard. Thus the CEGB set it at 19%, made up 
of a de-rating factor of 11% and remaining outage risks of 6%, so that the de-rated 
reliability margin was 7% (6%/0.89). Such quantitative measures sit well within the 
planning framework of a centrally controlled electricity system pre-liberalization. 
The other more market-oriented approach to reliability is to specify the Value of 
Lost Load, VoLL, the amount that consumers should be willing to pay to avoid 
disconnection. In a future with sufficiently smart meters, consumers would be able to 
sign a contract with the electricity supplier stating the maximum amount they would be 
willing to pay for each tranche of firm power, with the smart meter disconnecting 
appliances at each specified price point, leaving some lights, television and electronic 
equipment until last. That would create the currently largely absent demand side and 
provide a private good market solution to the problem. It could avoid the missing money 
if not the missing (future) market problem, provided the short-run prices were set at their 
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efficient scarcity value. This is the sum of the System Marginal Cost (SMC) plus a 
Capacity Payment, CP, where 
CP = LoLP*(VoLL-SMC).     (1) 
The relationship between the security standard and the VoLL is symmetric, in that 
if capacity investment decisions are based on revenues determined by (1) and the VoLL 
is pre-determined, then the resulting capacity will give rise to a LoLE. If the standard is a 
predetermined LoLE, the cost of new capacity implies a cost of delivering the LoLP and 
hence an implied VoLL.  
Britain has followed both models. The English Pool from 1989 to 2001 set the 
VoLL at £(2012)5,000 (€6,250)/MWh, letting the market determine capacity. After the 
Pool was replaced with an energy-only market in 2001, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) specified the LoLE.  National Grid (2014a) deduced the 2018 
VoLL as £(2012)17,000/MWh (€(2012)21,250/MWh), higher than direct estimates of the 
willingness to pay to avoid disconnections (London Economics, 2013). 
 
2.3 Can energy-only markets deliver adequate reliability? 
One completely legitimate case for a capacity payment is that if generators are required to 
bid their Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC, mostly fuel costs), as under the Bidding Code 
of Practice of the SEM (SEM, 2007), they will fail to recover their fixed costs without 
such an addition. The Electricity Pool of England and Wales also added the CP of (1), but 
allowed generators to offer an unrestricted supply function (which, given their market 
power, was often above SRMC, Green and Newbery, 1992; Newbery, 1995; Sweeting, 
2007). In this period of benign liberalization, high electricity prices and low gas prices 
led to considerable entry and an excessive reserve margin. 
In the energy-only market envisaged by the TEM, generators will offer supply 
functions that should reflect the scarcity value of electricity (and their degree of market 
power). Figure 2 shows the day-ahead price duration curves for several European power 
exchanges in 2012. What is striking is that most exchange prices do not exceed 
€200/MWh, and even the most peaky, France, only does so 0.25 of 1% of the time (about 
22 hours per year). Given that the VoLL in the English Pool until 2001 was 
€(2012)6,250/MWh and the current implied VoLL in GB is €(2012)21,250/MWh, these 
prices indicate a low LoLP or high reliability. Given existing capacity levels that is a 
reasonable inference, but the problem again is one of missing (futures) markets. 
Investment lags in delivering capacity adequacy are 2-4 years for peaking plant (longer 
for most base-load plant), beyond the time horizon of adequately liquid futures markets 
(and they only offer one year’s hedge). 
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On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the 2008 balancing buy prices9 in the 
energy-only market that replaced the Pool were considerably peakier than the old Pool 
prices (which included an explicit CP and also probably reflected more market power). 
Thus energy-only markets can reflect scarcity, and properly calculated capacity payments 
may be very low if the reserve margin is adequate, as LoLP is roughly exponential in 
demand less de-rated capacity (Newbery, 2005). However, by 2013-14, the GB 
Balancing Mechanism had a price duration curve quite similar to those shown in Figure 
2, with prices above €200/MWh for less than 0.25 of 1% of the time, and well below the 
French day-ahead price duration curve. 
Thus one might conclude that energy-only markets (which include balancing 
markets) can deliver sufficiently sharp scarcity prices that should signal the profitability 
of adequate new investment, provided all the other security services are adequately 
remunerated (i.e. resolving any of those missing market problems). This might be 
plausible if all investment decisions were taken on commercial grounds as in the 1990s, 
that prices were not capped, that the policy environment were predictable and stable, and 
that either liquid forward market existed for a reasonably fraction of the proposed plant 
life (i.e. 20+ years ahead of the final investment decision) or credible long-term power 
purchase agreements could be signed with credit-worthy counterparties. Unfortunately, 
hardly any of these conditions hold in the TEM.  
2.4 Market, institutional and political/regulatory failures 
While price caps are set at rather low levels in the U.S., exacerbating the “missing 
money” problem, there are also, if much higher, price caps in EUPHEMIA (for day-
ahead at €3,000/MWh, a price that France has hit on numerous occasions). The lack of 
forward markets and long-term contracts might not be so critical if the future were 
reasonably predictable and stable, but this is far from the case at present. EU Climate 
Change policy is failing, in conflict with Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), and surely 
ripe for as yet uncertain reform. Large volumes of unreliable renewables increase the 
need for flexible reserves, which in the past came from obsolescing plant, mostly oil or 
coal. This plant is now being decommissioned because of the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive and the Integrated Emissions Directive.  
Increasing volumes of renewables (mainly wind and solar PV) add little to 
reliable capacity, as it is unavailable on still cold dark winter nights, but reduces average 
wholesale prices. If the average capacity factor of on-shore wind is 25%, then the GB 
target of 30% of electricity from wind requires capacity of 30/25 times or 120% of 
average demand. In windy conditions that would often displace all conventional plant and 
could lead, under present subsidy structures, to negative prices. 
Intermittent generation increases the need for additional flexible plant that can be 
called up at short notice if the wind falls or the sun fades. In addition, new plant will be 
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needed to replace retiring plant (not just coal, but in the UK, France and Germany, 
substantial volumes of nuclear plant as well). That plant will need considerably higher 
prices than recently experienced to be profitable. The EU is committed to an 80% 
reduction in Greenhouse Gas emissions by 2050. Coal is twice the carbon intensity of 
gas, so utilities are unlikely to build durable (40-60 years) coal-fired plant that would face 
tight future emissions limits, leaving gas-fired plant as the only alternative. 
Unfortunately, crashed electricity prices and high gas prices precipitated by the closure of 
Japan’s nuclear fleet made their economics very unattractive. 
The UK introduced a carbon price floor in the 2011 Budget (HMT, 2011) that 
would support the price of CO2 at £16/tonne in 2013, rising to £30/tonne (€35/tonne) in 
2020, and projected to rise to £70/tonne by 2030 (all at 2009 prices). As an example of 
policy instability, the 2014 Budget froze the carbon price floor – clearly an instrument 
subject to the whim of chancellors creates additional investment uncertainty. It would be 
a brave politician who trusted these markets to deliver reliability.  
 
3. The UK Electricity Market Reform and the capacity auction 
The UK led the European move to liberalized unbundled electricity markets by 
restructuring and privatizing most of the electricity supply industry in 1989. The 
generation companies inherited aging coal plant delivering 76% of output, with nuclear 
power 22% of the total and gas zero. By 2000, nuclear still provided 22%, but after the 
“dash for gas” new efficient combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) contributed 35%, 
displacing coal whose share had fallen to 41%. Non-thermal renewables accounted for 
just 2% of the total (DECC, 2015).  
Newbery (2012a, 2013) documents the analysis that led to the UK’s Electricity 
Market Reform (EMR) and its embodiment in the Energy Act 2013. Briefly, in response 
to the consultation on the Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), the UK Government 
accepted one of the most challenging renewables targets (relative to its initial position) of 
15% and promised to source 40% of electricity from low carbon sources and around 30% 
of electricity from renewables by 2020 (DECC, 2009). These ambitious targets 
undermined confidence that there would be any support for conventional generation, 
much of which was due to retire as a result of the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive 
(LCPD) and the EU Industrial Emissions Directive. Between 2008 and 2014 6 GW of 
coal plant closed, and 1.9 GW converted to biomass, reducing total coal capacity by 8 
GW (out of a total non-renewable capacity in 2008 of 69 GW). In addition 1.6 GW of 
nuclear power and 2.8 GW of large oil-fired capacity closed, or in total 10.4 GW, with 
more expected to exit before 2016.10 By 2014 nuclear’s share of output had fallen to 
                                                 
10 National Grid provides annual updates of the capacity and fuel of every grid-connected 
generator in its Electricity Ten Year Statements (and earlier Seven Year Statements) at 
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Future-of-Energy/Electricity-Ten-Year-
Statement/  
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18%, gas to 29%, but coal held up at 39% as coal and carbon prices fell, and renewables 
rose to 13% (DECC, 2015). 
Faced with concerns over security of supply, the regulator, Ofgem, launched 
Project Discovery in June 2009.  Ofgem’s predicted de-rated capacity margin fell below 
5% by 2015 except under an optimistic “dash for energy” scenario (Ofgem, 2010, p40), 
and so Ofgem concluded that “(T)he unprecedented combination of the global financial 
crisis, tough environmental targets, increasing gas import dependency and the closure of 
ageing power stations has combined to cast reasonable doubt over whether the current 
energy arrangements will deliver secure and sustainable energy supplies.” (Ofgem, 
2010). 
Ofgem’s Electricity Capacity Assessment Report 2014 confirmed these 
predictions, noting that the de-rated capacity margin could vary between 2% and 8% in 
2015/16, and that the LOLE could, in response to the falling margin, increase to a 
maximum of 9 hours in 2015/16. Ofgem also noted that without reforms to the balancing 
mechanism, “the likelihood of controlled disconnections would vary between about 1 in 8 
to 1 in 4 years in 2015/16 ... However, if National Grid procured the maximum volume of 
new balancing services it has indicated for 2015/16, the additional measures would 
reduce the risk of disconnections to up to around 1 in 73 to 1 in 31 years...” (Ofgem, 
2014, p8). The consequential Expected Energy Unserved (EEU) for 2015/16 varied 
between 198 MWh to 20,864 MWh. To put these numbers in perspective, the highest 
EEU is less than 0.01 of 1% of annual demand, and if it corresponded to 9 hours of Loss 
of Load events, it would still represent full disconnection for only 4% of total load in 
those 9 hours. 
DECC responded to Project Discovery with a similar diagnosis (DECC, 2010). 
Renewable electricity suffered from both the missing money and missing market 
problems, as support was provided by Premium Feed-in Tariffs via Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs). Their value depends on future electricity prices and the 
supply-demand balance for the ROC s, both potentially volatile. While fossil generation 
enjoyed a natural hedge as electricity prices mirror fossil fuel prices (Newbery, 2013, fig 
2), renewables and nuclear power, whose fuel costs are zero or very small, are exposed to 
the full volatility of electricity prices (Roques et al., 2006; 2008). This increases risk and 
hence raises the cost of capital, the major part of the total cost.  
The ensuing Energy Act 2013 (gradually) replaces volatile ROCs with long-term 
fixed-price Contracts-for-Differences (CfDs) for zero-carbon generation to solve both the 
missing money and the missing futures market problems. An Emissions Performance 
Standard rules out new unabated coal plant, and acts as a back-stop to the less credible 
Carbon Price Support (a tax to bring the EU carbon price up to the projected carbon price 
floor), while a Capacity Mechanism addresses the issue of capacity adequacy. Britain 
now has the Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change, advised by DECC, 
deciding how much capacity is required. The capacity auction is a single-price 
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descending clock auction with a demand schedule as shown in figure 4. National Grid as 
SO was charged to recommend the target volume of capacity to secure four years after 
the auction (which was termed the T-4 auction).   
National Grid (2014a) chose the amount to procure balancing the cost of 
additional capacity against the cost of the Expected Energy Unserved, as shown in Figure 
5. National Grid (2014a) projected that the auction clearing price would likely be set at 
the net Cost of New Entry (CONE), estimated at £49/kWyr. This was the missing money 
a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) might need given its revenues from all other 
markets and after paying the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges. 
These range from £30/kWyr (in NW Scotland), to negative (-£5/kWyr in Cornwall) 
(National Grid, 2013) and are designed to guide new generation to where most needed. 
Entrants are given 15-year indexed contracts, while existing plant receive one-year 
contracts to defer exit decisions until the next auction.  
The missing money can be roughly estimated from the VoLL (£17/kWh) less the 
maximum the SO pays for balancing actions (£6/kWh) to give £11/kWh, times 3 hrs 
LoLE, or £33/kWyr. The effective cap in the Balancing Mechanism of £9,999/MWh 
would reduce the missing money to £21/kWyr. Both numbers suggest a net CONE of 
£49/kWyr is high or that other energy services are under-rewarded. 
The auction design was best-practice (Newbery and Grubb, 2015) but flawed in 
requiring the SO to advise the minister on the procurement amount. The SO stands 
accountable if “the lights go out” but does not pay for the capacity. The minister wishes 
to avoid newspaper headlines predicting blackouts resulting from his decision. Both 
argue for excess procurement. DECC appointed an independent Panel of Technical 
Experts (PTE) to comment on the analysis, and they made a number of strong (but, for 
the 2014 auction, ineffective) criticisms. 
3.1 Criticisms of the capacity to procure 
The PTE first criticized the terminology of “Loss of Load” as emotive and misleading. 
The GB regulator, Ofgem, defines a “Loss of Load event” as one in which market 
demand exceeds market supply and as such the SO has to intervene to balance the 
system. For that purpose the SO can call on a range of increasingly expensive options: 
asking generators to temporarily exceed rated capacity; invoking ‘new balancing 
services’;11 cutting interconnector exports to zero; requesting imports; reducing voltage 
(“brown outs”),12 before finally resorting to selective disconnections. The crucial point is 
that these actions cost less, often much less, than VoLL and hence bias the unserved load 
cost and the target capacity in figure 5 upward.  
                                                 
11   “The new balancing services are Demand Side Balancing Reserve (DSBR) and Supplemental 
Balancing Reserve (SBR).” National Grid announced its tender for these new services on 10 June 
2014 (http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/additionalmeasures ). 
12 The CEGB estimated that voltage reductions reduce load by 7½% in the 1970s (Bates and 
Fraser, 1974) but National Grid now estimates only 1½% in the absence of firm evidence. 
12 
 
Successful Capacity Market Units in the auction receive a Capacity Agreement 
which requires them to be available in “stress events” signaled four hours ahead. DECC 
(2014c, §391) defines these events as “any settlement periods in which either voltage 
control or controlled load shedding are experienced at any point on the system for 15 
minutes or longer. …  Periods of voltage control or load shedding resulting from failures 
or deficiencies in the transmission or distribution systems are not considered as stress 
events.” However, these “notices of inadequate system margin” are issued “based on the 
available capacity (declared ‘maximum export limit’ (MEL) minus transmission system 
demand and reserve for response capacity).”  DECC (2014c, box, p107.) 
National Grid (2014a) chose the amount to procure using a Least Worst Regrets 
approach as it was unwilling to attach explicit probabilities to the various scenarios 
considered. The result of overvaluing the cost of “Loss of Load” is to increase the 
capacity at which the Least Worst Regret cost schedule is minimized (figure 5). “Slow 
progression” reaches a cost minimum at 53.3 GW for 2018-19 delivery. The net 
procurement target is 53.3-w-x-y-z-0.4 GW, where w, x, y and z refer to various 
distributed energy resources and opt-out plant. The 0.4 GW is existing short-term 
operating reserve.  
The PTE (DECC, 2014a) strongly criticized National Grid for assuming no net 
imports in stress periods, despite 3.75 GW interconnection capacity and potential new 
interconnector capacity of 2.25 GW that might be available by 2018-19. This seemed 
perverse, as all parties (Ofgem, DECC and National Grid) agreed interconnectors 
increased security. Three reports commissioned by these parties (Pöyry, 2012, 2013; 
Redpoint, 2013) argued that interconnector capacity could displace domestic capacity by 
50-80% of its value. Even DECC’s Final Impact Assessment, published just before the 
procurement decision (DECC, 2014b), estimated the amount of interconnector capacity to 
include in the total procurement amount at 2.9 GW. Ignoring interconnectors could move 
the auction clearing price from the net cost of new entry of £49/kWyr to that set by 
existing plant (maximum of £25/kWyr), increasing the expected cost of procurement by 
£1.3 billion per year for the following 15 years. 
Ignoring interconnectors seemed particularly perverse as the TEM aims to 
integrate markets across borders. Market coupling already dispatches GB Continental 
interconnectors in the EUPHEMIA day-ahead market (DAM). Interconnector flows 
already reflect willingness to pay in the DAM, and will soon do so in the intra-day and 
real time markets when network codes are agreed. 
 
3.2 Possible consequences of excessive capacity procurement 
Excess procured capacity will lower future wholesale prices with a number of effects, not 
all immediately obvious. First, lower prices reduce the revenue new entrants can expect 
from the energy markets, increase the net CONE and raise the auction price. Second, it 
undermines the old market design in which investment in conventional generation was at 
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the discretion of private companies making commercial decisions. No company would 
invest in conventional generation without a capacity agreement given its large 
disadvantage compared to those with agreements. The amount of new plant will therefore 
be entirely determined by the minister, ending a key element of the liberalized market. 
All non-fossil generation will also be granted long-term CfDs under the EMR, moving 
Britain to the Single Buyer model ruled out in earlier EU Electricity Directives. 
Third, lower prices increase payments to low-carbon CfDs, which receive the 
difference between the contracted strike and wholesale price. As the Government limits 
total renewables payments through the Levy Control Framework, the perverse effect is to 
support less renewable electricity, although the EMR was designed to remove obstacles 
to meeting the renewables target. 
Fourth, the commercial case for interconnectors depends on price differences, 
with GB typically importing from cheaper Continental markets. Lower GB prices reduce 
arbitrage profits, undermining the investment case for the additional interconnectors 
when they are increasingly needed to balance growing intermittent generation across 
wider market areas. Ignoring interconnectors risks a self-fulfilling but expensive policy of 
autarky. 
Fifth, although the future wholesale price will be lower, offsetting possibly a large 
part of the consumer cost, it will be hard to convince consumers of this. They will see the 
gross cost, which was estimated at 53.3 GW x £49m/GWyr = £2.6 billion per year.  
Finally, on 2nd December 2014, after the PTE had published its critical report and 
the Secretary of State had decided on the procurement volume, but before the auction on 
18th December, the Treasury’s National Infrastructure Plan announced that 
interconnectors would be eligible for the 2015 capacity market.13 It would have been easy 
to have left room for interconnectors (e.g. adding another element to the -w-x-y-z-0.4 GW 
deductions from the target volume) and lower the net amount to procure. 
 
3.3 The outcome of the 2014 capacity auction 
The auction cleared at £(2012) 19.40/kWyr (National Grid, 2014b). The auction produced 
several surprises. First, the auction cleared at less than 40% of the predicted net CONE 
value of £49/kWyr (although close to the missing money estimated above assuming a 
balancing cap of £9,999/MWh). The estimated net CONE was based on new entry of 
CCGT, and two CCGTs entered, supplying about 60% of the total 2,795 MW new entry. 
Second, the next largest (28%) entry category was Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGTs)/ 
reciprocating engines, average size 11 MW. The third largest contribution (6%) was from 
unproven Demand Side Response (DSR, all with a one-year contract, other new entrants 
have 15-year contracts).  
One might expect that DSR and OCGTs would require a lower strike price, 
particularly as they can contribute to significantly reducing TNUoS charges if they are 
                                                 
13 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-infrastructure-plan  
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embedded with major loads, but the low price that CCGTs were willing to accept is 
surprising, and may be based on optimistic views of gas prices (which were expected to 
decline by the time of the auction) or high balancing prices. National Grid announced its 
tender for new balancing services on 10 June 2014,14 reducing the extent of the missing 
money for these services after DECC had published its estimate of the net CONE.   
The final point is that the auction demonstrates the value of market-based 
methods of revealing entry costs, and the danger of leaving such decisions to SOs or 
regulators (as in the SEM,15 where the regulators calculate the cost of Best New Entry 
and set it at a high price).  
4. Biases in capacity auctions and energy-only markets 
The arguments above strongly suggest that if procurement decisions are left to politicians 
advised by the SO, they will err on the high side, and tend to ignore supplies from outside 
their control area (over interconnectors). Their caution is exacerbated by the emotive and 
misleading terminology of “Loss of Load”. Some of these shortcomings can be addressed 
by requiring the SO to cost and quantify the actions that are taken in stress events that fall 
short of controlled disconnections. Delegating the decision to independent agencies, 
perhaps to an Independent Planning and System Operator could depoliticize the decision 
(but might not remove the fear of disconnections through inadequacy, nor the bias of not 
paying for capacity).  
There is a more fundamental problem in that if future energy prices are 
competitively delivered and if all security services (ancillary and balancing) are properly 
priced, the missing market and missing money problems can both be addressed by 
offering suitable hedging contracts, of which the auctioned capacity agreement is an 
excellent example. Price caps could be replaced by reliability options or one-way CfDs 
that have a high strike price, and which allow consumers or their suppliers to hedge 
against high prices while allowing the spot and balancing market prices to reach scarcity 
levels needed for efficient actions (in demand reduction and interconnector trade) (see 
e.g. Vásquez et al, 2002; Bidwell, 2005). 
Now consider the costs of under or over-specifying the amount to procure. Over-
procurement, as noted above, risks depressing future prices and hence reducing future 
energy and ancillary service revenues, requiring a higher auction price in compensation. 
While addressing the missing markets problem it risks amplifying the missing money 
problem. In contrast, under-procurement leads to expectations of higher future prices, 
requiring a lower capacity auction bid as the capacity agreement does not preclude 
earning revenues in all the energy markets. If the price is very low, investors may 
conclude that investing without a capacity agreement has relatively low risk, particularly 
                                                 
14 At http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/additionalmeasures  
15 See http://www.allislandproject.org/en/cp_current-consultations.aspx?article=75c548a7-34ee-
497c-afd2-62f8aa0062df  
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as the design of the GB auction offers a T-4 contract of 15 years for new plant, but 
successive T-1 contracts of one-year for existing plant at the same clearing price, for 
which speculative plant would be eligible. A signal to err on the side of under-
procurement would be underwritten by the ability to true up closer to delivery, reducing 
risks, as any over-procurement would merely delay the moment at which more capacity 
was needed in the auction, and should limit the period of inadequate revenue to a year or 
so. 
5. Is there a need for regional coordination? 
Eureletric (2015) argues strongly for a design of regional capacity markets which places 
the obligation on generation (or demand) regardless of national location. This would 
require a common regional capacity adequacy assessment and no double payment (i.e. if 
capacity has an agreement from country A it would be denied one from B and would be 
excluded from B’s capacity assessment, subject to adequate interconnector capacity from 
B to A). As such it may well be suited to the meshed Continental network where power 
flows according to Kirchoff’s Laws, but not necessarily to DC-linked systems. 
For markets interconnected over DC links it is not the simplest way of addressing 
the problem. The underlying problem is that investors lack confidence that they will 
secure an adequate return. This has two dimensions – future prices may not properly 
reflect scarcity and other attributes of security, and future prices cannot be hedged and so 
are risky. Long-term contracts address the latter, efficient short-run pricing the former. 
Provided the auction platform can accommodate efficient scarcity prices (i.e. provided at 
least the intra-day and balancing markets are not capped at too low a level), then trading 
over any interconnector will only benefit a country that ensures that the relevant prices 
are efficient, as in equation (1). Suppose A and B trade but A has a higher VoLL than B, 
and hence a larger reliability margin. If A and B both have stress events, A can outbid B 
to secure imports, with B accepting a higher LoLP reflecting its lower willingness to pay 
to avoid disconnections. A can ensure that domestic consumers are insulated from these 
high trading prices via Reliability Options.  
The logic of making adequacy as close as possible to a private market good 
(through allowing efficient pricing) is that there can be gains from trade for the efficiently 
priced market even when market designs are different. If prices are inefficient in B, then 
it is they who lose, not A. That provides incentives to reform and avoids the need for 
politically fraught agreements on harmonization. The important design question to 
address is how best to ensure that prices for trading over interconnectors properly reflect 
scarcity. It may be that a scarcity adder (e.g. the CP in equation (1) or an amount to bring 
the supply schedule up to the full price in (1)) must be administratively added, or there 
may be other ways in which the SO can ensure that the trading country acquires all it 
needs up to the VoLL before controlled disconnections, but such design issues can be 
devolved to Member States (MSs). 
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The most important EU-level issue is to ensure that MSs cannot invoke security 
of supply as a reason for arbitrary interventions in the free flow of electricity across 
borders. The present arrangements are governed by the Security of Supply Directive 
(2005/89/EC),16 but there are concerns that political imperatives could over-ride market 
outcomes or those set out in SO to SO agreements as to what should happen in 
simultaneous stress events in which the auction allocation mechanism fails (perhaps 
because it has reached its price cap). If the goal of European market integration is to be 
achieved, MSs must be confident that they can secure supplies up to their VoLL, in return 
for which they should be willing to offer supplies to other MS at prices above their local 
VoLL, without arbitrary interventions. 
That leaves the question of how to deal with the case in which MS A places the 
capacity obligation on the interconnector owner (as will be the case in Britain) while MS 
B places the obligation on generators, some of whom are located in A. This could be 
handled by barring such generators from any capacity agreements in A, and requiring B 
to buy back the associated volume of interconnector capacity from the interconnector 
owner, with the agreement stating that if the auction prices reach the caps or the market 
coupling ceases to allocate in a stress situation in B, then that volume of imports by B 
will be assured. As such it can be devolved to bilateral agreements. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Missing money and missing markets provide compelling reasons for a capacity payment 
in competitive electricity markets dominated by politically determined and subsidized 
unreliable generation and where investors lack confidence in future revenues. Some 
countries may have surplus capacity and may be under no immediate pressure to 
encourage new investment, and can defer addressing these questions, but many countries 
will find a need to encourage efficient investment if only to address increasing 
intermittent renewables penetration. It may be that well-designed markets can secure the 
required flexible capacity but it is more likely that tender auctions/contracts will also be 
needed, and these have much in common with capacity auctions. 
Capacity auctions (GB provides a good example) address the missing money 
problem and part of the missing market problem (the missing futures markets). Other 
signals for location, flexibility, etc. needed to deliver security still need efficient 
solutions, which may be best supplied by markets, auctions or procurement contracts. 
The part of the adequacy debate that has been neglected is how to, and who should, 
determine the amount and type of capacity to procure (generation, DSR, interconnection), 
a problem that is exacerbated by misunderstandings over what a “Loss of Load” event 
means and what it might cost.  
This paper argues that this neglect biases towards over-procurement, which leads 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy that merchant generation investment can no longer be relied 
                                                 
16 At http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l27016  
17 
 
upon. Perversely, this exacerbates the missing money problem that capacity auctions 
were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of 
the missing market problems that have also been neglected in the debate. 
Whether or not interconnectors should be included in auctions is less important 
than that their contribution should be recognized in determining the procurement amount. 
All British interconnectors are HVDC controllable links whose flows can be rapidly 
reversed and as such could provide extra imports at short notice. The UK Government, 
possibly under pressure from DG COMP over State Aid concerns after the PTE had 
published their criticisms (DECC, 2014a), decided to include interconnectors in the next 
auction for 2019-20 delivery, and consult on how to determine their reliable capacity. 
There remain a number of policy issues to resolve, not least how the European 
auction platform EUPHEMIA will determine the direction of flows close to real time, 
when stress events that the capacity auction was designed to address are likely to emerge. 
EUPHEMIA has a €3,000/MWh price cap on the DAM, well below the VoLL. It has not 
yet (mid-2015) fixed price caps for intra-day and balancing actions, nor are these markets 
yet fully operational. If prices in the real time European markets could properly reflect 
scarcity, and if each Member State’s market could deliver the true scarcity prices to 
EUPHEMIA (including the CP of equation (1)) then good market design and pricing 
would deliver efficient solutions, and other countries with less good pricing would lose 
out, motivating them to improve their market design.  
Price caps hinder this aim, and instead good rules will be needed for out-of-
market actions when price caps are reached, and/or markets no longer determine flows, 
and SOs have to intervene. These rules or bilateral agreements between the SOs at each 
end of interconnectors are currently lacking or incomplete and may need to be addressed 
through a revised Security of Supply Directive, and in the meantime by carefully designed 
SO to SO agreements, overseen by the relevant MS regulators (and possibly by the 
European Commission if they may adversely impact other trade flows). If these problems 
can be addressed, then the more demanding task of harmonizing regional capacity 
markets may be unnecessary and individual MSs can design their own Capacity 
Mechanisms, drawing on the GB and other experiences. 
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